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Abstract
The study of fairness in intelligent decision systems has mostly ignored long-term influence
on the underlying population. Yet fairness considerations (e.g. affirmative action) have often
the implicit goal of achieving balance among groups within the population. The most basic
notion of balance is eventual equality between the qualifications of the groups. How can we
incorporate influence dynamics in decision making? How well do dynamics-oblivious fairness
policies fare in terms of reaching equality? In this paper, we propose a simple yet revealing model
that encompasses (1) a selection process where an institution chooses from multiple groups
according to their qualifications so as to maximize an institutional utility and (2) dynamics that
govern the evolution of the groups’ qualifications according to the imposed policies. We focus
on demographic parity as the formalism of affirmative action.
We then give conditions under which an unconstrained policy reaches equality on its own. In
this case, surprisingly, imposing demographic parity may break equality. When it doesn’t, one
would expect the additional constraint to reduce utility, however, we show that utility may in
fact increase. In more realistic scenarios, unconstrained policies do not lead to equality. In such
cases, we show that although imposing demographic parity may remedy it, there is a danger
that groups settle at a worse set of qualifications. As a silver lining, we also identify when
the constraint not only leads to equality, but also improves all groups. This gives quantifiable
insight into both sides of the mismatch hypothesis. These cases and trade-offs are instrumental in
determining when and how imposing demographic parity can be beneficial in selection processes,
both for the institution and for society on the long run.
1 Introduction
As many aspects of human society become increasingly automated, questions of ethical nature
migrate into the technological sphere. Admittedly, no amount of formalization can capture all the
complexity and subtlety of these issues. Yet, one is compelled to mathematize them and integrate
them with familiar frameworks. The result of this process is the design of purportedly ethically-
minded technology. An important component of this process, then, is to understand just how well
such technology interacts with society and whether its use does indeed result in the intended effect.
Automated decision and policy making, particularly the data-driven case embodied by machine
learning, is one such technology that has recently allotted considerable attention to these ethical
questions. In particular, guaranteeing non-discriminatory behavior has been at the forefront of
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research. Various formalizations of non-discrimination have been proposed, relationships between
these notions have been studied [DHP+12, HPS+16], and fundamental trade-offs have been iden-
tified [KMR16]. Yet the influence of the resulting decision systems on society has only garnered
modest treatment [LDR+18]. One place where this question has been thoroughly considered is
in studying the evolution of negative stereotypes in labor markets, in economics [CL93, HC18].
The dynamics there, however, are very carefully crafted to mimic the labor market. To relate the
formalism of the current paper with these prior work, see Section 2.
This paper starts by proposing a selection process where an institution chooses from multiple
groups according to their qualifications so as to maximize an institutional utility. In this context,
non-discrimination often takes the form of constraining the type of selection policies. Demographic
parity, for example, enforces groups to have equal selection rates. This is a simple yet rich model
that has been well studied [HPS+16] [KMR16], and as such this paper chooses it as the archetype
of non-discrimination, referring to it with the more colloquial name of affirmative action (AA).
But non-discrimination is rarely a goal in and of itself. Ultimately, one tacitly expects a benefit to
society. What kind of expected benefit is implicit in AA? The fact that a fully transformed society
does not require non-discrimination hints at a possible answer. This is in particular true if the
groups themselves are indistinguishable. If one accepts that such social equality is the intended
effect of non-discrimination, then the question becomes: does AA lead to it? To answer this,
modeling how the populations change in response to policies is not simply a luxury, but a necessity.
This paper starts with some natural tenets, and derives from them a model of dynamics that govern
the evolution of the groups’ qualifications according to the imposed policies. These dynamics are
general enough to model behavior beyond the specific ones in prior work.
The paper then proceeds by first giving conditions under which an unconstrained policy reaches
equality on its own. In this case, surprisingly, imposing AA may break equality. When it doesn’t,
one would expect the additional constraint to reduce utility, however, it can be shown that utility
may in fact increase. In practice, AA acts in two possible ways. Either selection rates of the
privileged are reduced or those of the underprivileged are increased [FK13]. This dichotomy is
at the heart of the starkly different ways in which non-discrimination manifests itself. In real
world scenarios, unconstrained policies do not lead to equality. In such cases, it can be shown
that although imposing AA may remedy it, there is a danger that groups settle at a worse set of
qualifications. As a silver lining, one can identify exactly when the constraint not only leads to
equality, but also improves all groups.
To summarize, the contributions of this paper are as follows:
• A simple yet flexible model for both a selection process by an institution and dynamics
describing the change in the population due to selection policies
• A characterization of the policies resulting from institutional utility maximization without
and with imposing affirmative action as non-discrimination
• Conditions under which society equalizes for each type of policy, along with the impact on
the long-term institutional utility
These cases and trade-offs are instrumental in determining when and how imposing demographic
parity can be beneficial in selection processes, both for the institution and for society on the long
run.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 covers the most relevant related work.
Section 3 formulates the problem and establishes the models. Section 4 derives the policies that
2
arise from the models and characterizes the conditions under which they lead to social equality.
Sections 6 and 7 study the contrast between imposing affirmative action or not, in the case when
not imposing it naturally leads to equality or not, respectively. Section 8 concludes.
2 Related Work
On the economics side, a large literature exists examining statistical discrimination, dating back
to Arrow [A+73]. Prior work has attempted to study the effect of affirmative action in the labor
market to remove stereotypes [CL93, HC18, MN04, ASW06, FV92], where stereotypes are defined
as misrepresenting the quality of a worker from a disadvantaged group, when groups are assumed
to be ex-ante equal. The models of [CL93] and [HC18] are the most related to the present work:
they both set up a game in a market between workers and employers, where workers have the
choice to invest in themselves to become qualified, and emit a test signal that employers threshold
as their policy. The dynamics that this game generates on the distribution of qualified individuals
per group is very specific. In particular, it is restricted to be unimodal. Both papers look at
sufficient conditions for equality and propose interventions to actively reach it. The current paper
trades off the concreteness of this line of work for more domain generality, through less specific
dynamics. This helps garner more insight about the fundamental interplay between the constraints
and changes in society. Moreover, examining dynamics and tracking the populations through time
instead of only looking at equilibria as in [MN04, FV92], allows comparing cumulative utility which
plays a role in short term considerations.
A recent work [LDR+18] raised very similar questions to the ones considered here. The main
difference in that setup is that individuals are characterized by a potentially non-binary score
and are studied over only a single step of the selection process. The influence of the selection is
modeled by a social utility function ∆ that can be interpreted as the expected change in score for an
individual due to selection. The authors do not suggest that this change is due to population shifts,
though it could be. Without tailoring ∆ specifically to have such an interpretation, it is not possible
to track distributions of scores over long time horizons. The dynamics proposed here implements
precisely that aspect and enables the study of both institutional utility and social equality that
emerge from fairness constraints. Another somewhat related work is that of [HSNL18], which
models the retention rate of users of a particular service as a function of that service’s quality.
There, this is thought of as the error of a learning algorithm and the authors propose a robust
learning approach to avoid amplifying the difference in retention rate by group.
The present formulation also bears some similarity to reinforcement learning due to the dynam-
ics being essentially Markovian. As such, it can be thought of as an optimal control problem. The
goal here however is to analyze policies that are unaware of the dynamics, and do not make an
explicit effort to learn it. Also, the focus is not simply on utility, but the secondary objective of
social equality too. Previous work [JJK+17] has explored fairness with learning, guaranteeing that
actions are preferentially selected only if they effectively generate more reward. However, there are
many key differences, such as the state and action space in the current model being continuous as
opposed to the discrete versions treated in [JJK+17] and having deterministic transitions. Work
in online decision making [JKMR16] has also explored fairness constraints, but in a bandit setting
that lacks the dynamical aspect.
3
3 Problem Formulation
3.1 Society: groups, qualification profiles
Throughout this paper, the total population is divided into two groups indexed by the variable G:
group G = A which constitutes the gA fraction and group G = B the gB = 1 − gA fraction. The
limitation to only two groups simplifies the exposition yet maintains the essence of the problem.
One can conceptually think of each individual in either group as having some attribute θ ∈
Θ that bears information about qualification. For example in a college admission scenario the
attribute θ can be: [GPA, SAT, Letters of recommendation]. This attribute is thought to provide
a complete description in this context. In what follows, θ is implicitly mapped through an estimator
F : θ → {0, 1} to a crisp evaluation of qualification: say v = 1 if qualified and v = 0 otherwise. The
assumption is that this binary classification is sufficient to characterize the utility that the individual
would bring. This is compatible with the work on statistical discrimination [CL93, HC18]. An
alternative way to reach this model is to first consider a more general multiclass characterization
and then show that a threshold policy is optimal with respect to utility and societal improvement,
as was done in [LDR+18]. This again indicates that a binary characterization, i.e. above and
below the threshold, is often sufficient. For the example of admissions, one can think of v = 1 as
indicating an individual likely to be successful in college.
Let the distribution of evaluations V = v in group G = j be denoted by pi(·|G = j). This
probability distribution is the qualification profile of group G = j. Instead of tracking individuals,
it is more natural to study changes in the population in terms of the qualification profiles of groups.
For example, in college admissions it is not the same students that would change their qualifications
in response to admission policies, but rather those of the next application cycle.
3.2 Institution: policy, utility, selection rates
The population undergoes a selection process. An institution, referred to also by policy maker,
designs a policy τ(V = v;G = j): {0, 1}×{A,B} → [0, 1] that maps each individual to a probability
of selection, possibly depending on the group identity. The institution also places a utility on each
possible evaluation v, through a map u : {0, 1} → R, v 7→ u(v). Since v = 1 and v = 0 are
assumed to be beneficial and detrimental respectively, and to avoid trivial policies where none/all
are selected in what follows, assume u(0) ≤ 0 ≤ u(1). The (average) institutional utility of a policy
can then be defined as follows:
U(τ) =
∑
j∈{A,B}
gj
∑
v∈{0,1}
u(v) · τ(V = v;G = j) · pi(v|G = j). (1)
Any given policy also defines (per group) selection rates: β(G = j) =
∑
v∈{0,1} τ(V = v;G =
j) · pi(V = v|G = j). For college admission, this corresponds to acceptance rates per group. Note
that each term in the sum is the rate corresponding to a particular evaluation. Denote these by
β(V = v;G = j) = τ(V = v;G = j) · pi(V = v|G = j). In what follows, for notational convenience,
the explicit ’V =’ and ‘G =’ are dropped from the expressions of the qualification profiles, policies,
and selection rates, since the context of the argument is clear.
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Figure 1: Selection process and influence dynamics – Two subgroups of the population have each
publicly known qualification profiles pi. An institution performs a selection by maximizing utility U ,
possibly subject to a non-discrimination constraint. The selection policies τ influence the profiles
at the next round, through dynamics f .
3.3 Influence Dynamics
The execution of a selection policy can be thought of as demarcating time t. The main premise of
this paper is that the selection process affects the population, namely by changing the qualification
profiles of either group at time t+ 1. This change can be interpreted in different ways. It could be
due to genuine change within society: the institutions’ policies can then be thought of as having
a secondary effect as social incentive or deterrent. But change could also be due to self-selection
in the pool of individuals available to the institution on the next time step: policies then have the
effect of filtering through time, possibly without society itself changing. Although the model is not
specific to an interpretation, when the perspective moves to social equality in Section 4, the tacit
assumption is that dynamics are due to genuine change.
Dynamics are in general very complicated. They may vary in time, be stochastic, and depend
on many parameters of the problem. Some of these aspects, however, are more relevant than others
for capturing the fundamental effects. In what follows, dynamics are taken to be time-invariant and
deterministic. Time-invariance is a convenient assumption, which can be supported by the slow
change in the way in which society responds to stimuli. Determinism does not mean that there is
no stochasticity within society, but that any such change is summarized through the evolution of
the qualifications. Moreover, one can interpret these deterministic dynamics as the expectation of a
more general stochastic dynamics. As such it is a Markovian assumption, with the state consisting
of the qualification profiles.
Finally, what parameters of the problem should govern change and in what manner should they
do so? There are three tenets that lead to this paper’s proposal:
(a) Within each group, there is an (a priori) distribution of potential qualifications, identical to
the qualification profiles at the previous time step.
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(b) Upon observing the previous time step’s policy, individuals respond by instantiating with
some probability as (a posteriori) qualified or unqualified.
(c) The response probabilities, which summarize how policies influence individuals, depend only
on the selection rates within the group of the individual and their potential qualification.
Tenet (a) describes society’s inertia in the absence of influencing policies. Tenet (b) could be
thought of as a result of adequate or lacking individual effort in response to policies. In tenet
(c), the fact that potentially qualified and potentially unqualified individuals may be influenced
differently is necessary for the history of qualifications to have relevance. The main restriction thus
is that the only influence of policies is through selection rates within a group. Lack of influence
across groups is an idealization of such influence arguably being weaker than within a group. As
for selection rates being the key variable rather than the selection policy itself, one can motivate
it by considering extremes: indeed, if no qualified (or unqualified) individuals exist then selection
policy for qualified (or unqualified) individuals is never observed and cannot have influence.
With these tenets, dynamics induced by the influence of policies can be defined as follows.
Assumption 3.1 (Dynamics). For a given group j , let pit(1|j) =: pit(1) (for clarity, the group
index is dropped here and later) denote the qualification profile of group j for v = 1 at time t and
let the policies τt at that time step induce the selection rates βt. Then the qualification profiles at
time t+ 1 are given by
pit+1(1) = pit(1) f1
(
βt(0), βt(1)
)
+ pit(0) f0
(
βt(0), βt(1)
)
(2)
where f0 and f1 are two arbitrary continuously differentiable functions [0, 1] × [0, 1] → [0, 1]. The
pair (f0, f1) is referred to as the dynamics.
These dynamics make the tenets concrete. For each group G = j, pit(·|j) describes the potential
qualification profile. The function f1 represents the retention at the top: the rate of retention of the
sub-population with potential v = 1 due to the current policy. The function f0 represents change
for the better : the fraction of the potential v = 0 sub-population that progresses to have evaluation
1. Equivalently, one can pair these with their counterparts to describe full conditional distributions.
The pair 1−f1 (change for the worse) and f1 are the conditional distribution describing the response
of an individual with potential v = 1 into actual evaluations 0 or 1 respectively, while the pair 1−f0
(retention at the bottom) and f0 are the same respectively for an individual with potential v = 0.
It is worth making a couple of remarks about these dynamics. First, the two groups’ responses
are identical since the choice of f1 and f0 does not depend on the group. To justify this, note
that in fairness considerations such as demographic parity one makes the inherent assumption that
the groups are ex-ante equal in all respect except for their qualification profiles, as otherwise there
may be other reasons to treat them differently based only on their identity. Second, the groups
do not interact through the functional form of the dynamics. Differences between groups and any
potential coupling between groups can only happen through the different and interacting selection
rates induced by the policies.
Finally, leaving f0 and f1 entirely arbitrary is good for generality but may lead to esoteric
behavior. It may be more reasonable to to restrict them in certain natural ways. One assumption
to make, for example, is that change is harder than retention.
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Assumption 3.2 (Status quo bias). For all x, y ∈ [0, 1]:
f1(x, y) ≥ f0(x, y).
3.4 Utility Maximization and Non-discrimination
The primary tendency of the institution is to maximize its average utility. Rarely, if ever, are
institutions aware of the underlying dynamics. Thus dynamics-oblivious policies are the appropriate
ones, where the utility is maximized over a single time step. Next, two approaches taken in
practice are modeled: unconstrained maximization without any non-discrimination considerations
and affirmative action via demographic parity.
3.4.1 Unconstrained
In the simplest of settings, institutional utility maximization amounts to solving the following linear
program (LP) at every time step t:
max
τ
Ut(τ), (3)
where Ut is as in (1), with all quantities defined at time step t.
3.4.2 Affirmative Action
If the evaluation v is perfect, then the unconstrained policy is trivially identity blind, thus one could
argue that it is fair in the sense of equalized opportunity [HPS+16]. However, as distributions
of qualified individuals differ per group, the policy will have different selection rates per group.
Affirmative action (AA), at an intuitive level, attempts to bridge such inequalities between different
groups. More precisely, AA forces equal aggregate selection rates between groups [CL93, HC18],
and it is more formally known as demographic parity [BHN18, LDR+18]. This paper adheres to
this as the archetype of non-discrimination.
Definition 3.3 (Affirmative Action). The affirmative action constraint forces the policy to select
at an equal rate between both groups:
β(A) = β(B) . (4)
Thus in this case, the policy maker solves (3) with the additional constraint (4). Since the
constraint is linear in τ , the optimal policy is also found via a LP. This is elaborated in Section 4.
4 Road to Equality
With the models of selection process, dynamics, and affirmative action in place, one can now ask the
main question: when and how can resulting policies lead to social equality? Perhaps the simplest
notion of equality within the population can be defined as the groups becoming indistinguishable
in their qualification profiles. This is formalized as follows.
Definition 4.1 (Social Equality). Under given dynamics (f0, f1), a policy is said to be equalizing
if for all starting pi0(1|A) and pi0(1|B)
lim
t→∞ |pit(1|A)− pit(1|B)| = 0
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When this happens, say that the policy/population reaches equality, which is understood to be in
an asymptotic sense.
This section characterizes the policies that result in both the unconstrained and affirmative
action settings, and studies the relationships between these policies and the conditions under which
they become equalizing.
4.1 Unconstrained
4.1.1 Resulting policy
First consider the case when the institution does not impose non-discrimination, that is the utility is
maximized as in (3) without further constraints. Denote this case by UN. It is then straightforward
to see that the optimal policies are τt(1; ·) = 1 and τt(0; ·) = 0 for all time t.
Note that the policy only depends on the distribution at time t. Any dynamics for group j is
thus simply of the form:
pit+1(1|j) = f(pit(1|j)),
where f is defined in terms of (f0, f1) according to Equation (2) as:
f(pi) = pif1(0, pi) + (1− pi)f0(0, pi).
For convenience denote the tth iterate of f by by f t.
4.1.2 Condition for equality
Can an unconstrained policy be equalizing? The following result from classical stability analysis,
proved for completeness in Appendix A, characterizes exactly when this is possible.
Proposition 4.2. Unconstrained dynamics, of the form pit+1 = f(pit) within each group, are equal-
izing if and only if f has a unique globally attracting equilibrium point pie.
It is worth noting that f may have a unique attracting point, in addition to a negligible number
of points that do not lead to this attracting point (say finitely many or a set of measure zero).
Since in real dynamics have some level of noise, these points won’t be influential. Without dwelling
on this further, this suggests that one could alternatively assume that f has a unique attracting
point, globally except for such a negligible set.
If f has a unique globally attracting equilibrium point then f t converges to pie as t → ∞, a
constant function which is trivially a contractive mapping. If this convergence is uniform, then
there is a large enough T such that fT is contractive. One could instead consider the following
stronger condition in the form of f itself being a contractive mapping.
Definition 4.3 (Contractivity). f : [0, 1]→ [0, 1] is a contractive mapping if ∃L ∈ [0, 1) such that
f is L-Lipschitz: ∀x, y ∈ [0, 1],
|f(x)− f(y)| ≤ L|x− y| .
If f is differentiable, then this condition is equivalent to having the derivative of f bounded
by L on [0, 1]. By an application of the Banach fixed-point theorem [Lat14], this shows that the
condition of Definition 4.3 is indeed sufficient for f to have a globally attracting equilibrium point.
Recall the following.
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Theorem 4.4. (Banach fixed-point theorem) Let (X, d) be a non-empty complete metric space and
let f : X → X be a contractive mapping. Then f admits a unique fixed-point xe ∈ X where xe
can be found by choosing any arbitrary element x0 ∈ X and iterating the function f , i.e. define
xt = f
t(x0), then xt → xe.
To stress again, contractivity is not a necessary condition to reach equality, but it is a simple
condition to place on the dynamics that captures the intuition of reaching equality. More impor-
tantly, since the dynamics are defined in terms of the functions f0 and f1, it is more useful to give
conditions on the latter to obtain a contractive f . For pi and pi′ such that pi − pi′ = ∆ > 0, rewrite
the requirement that |f(pi)− f(pi′)| ≤ L ·∆ for L ∈ [0, 1) as:
|f(pi)− f(pi′)| = ∣∣ pif1(0, pi) + f0(0, pi)− pif0(0, pi)− (pi′f1(0, pi′) + f0(0, pi′)− pi′f0(0, pi′)) ∣∣
= | pi(f1(0, pi)− f1(0, pi −∆)) + (1− pi)(f0(0, pi)− f0(0, pi −∆))
+∆(f1(0, pi −∆)− f0(0, pi −∆))| < L (5)
A first step is to take both f1 and f0 to be Lipschitz.
Assumption 4.5. f1 and f0 are `1 Lipschitz continuous with constants L1 and L0 respectively.
That is ∀x1, x2, y1, y2 ∈ [0, 1]:
|f1(x1, x2)− f1(y1, y2)| ≤ L1(|x1 − y1|+ |x2 − y2|)
and
|f0(x1, x2)− f0(y1, y2)| ≤ L0(|x1 − y1|+ |x2 − y2|) .
This assumption is reasonable as one would expect the jump in the rate of retention (f1) or
rate of change (f0) to be bounded as a function of the jump in the selection rates. But looking at
Equation (5), it is not sufficient. How large should L0 and L1 be?
|f(pi)− f(pi′)| ≤ |pi(f1(0, pi)− f1(0, pi −∆))|+ |(1− pi)(f0(0, pi)− f0(0, pi −∆))|
+ |∆(f1(0, pi −∆)− f0(0, pi −∆))| (triangle inequality)
< ∆(piL1 + (1− pi)L0 + |f1(0, pi −∆)− f0(0, pi −∆)|) (6)
Thus a sufficient condition for f to be a contractive mapping is:
LUN := max
pi∈[0,1],∆<pi
piL1 + (1− pi)L0 + |f1(0, pi −∆)− f0(0, pi −∆|) < 1 (7)
4.1.3 Speed of convergence
Contractivity is a restrictive condition but it has the obvious benefit of easily describing the rate
at which the population reaches equality. In particular, if
max
j∈{A,B}
|pi0(1|j)− pie| ≤ ∆ ,
then
|pit(1|A)− pit(1|B)| ≤ 2∆Lt.
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Equality is reached at a linear rate (in the exponent): to equalize to within an  difference, about
log /∆
logL time steps are sufficient.
4.2 Affirmative Action
4.2.1 Two resulting policies
The following characterizes the solution of maximizing the utility as in (3) under the additional
constraint (4). The proof can be found in Appendix A.
Proposition 4.6. Assume that at time t group j is advantaged, defined as pit(1|j) ≥ pit(1|¬j).
Then the optimal policy is one of two cases, depending only on gj, u(0), and u(1):
AA– If gju(1) + (1− gj)u(0) ≤ 0, then
τt(1; j) =
pit(1|¬j)
pit(1|j) , τt(0; j) = 0 (under-acceptance),
τt(1;¬j) = 1, τt(0;¬j) = 0 .
AA+ If gju(1) + (1− gj)u(0) ≥ 0, then
τt(1; j) = 1, τt(0; j) = 0,
τt(1;¬j) = 1, τt(0;¬j) = pit(1|j)−pit(1|¬j)1−pit(1|¬j) (over-acceptance).
There are two possible cases through which affirmative action impacts the policy, denoted by
AA– and AA+. These represent two drastically different approaches to fairness. AA– (under-
acceptance) accepts fewer qualified individuals from the advantaged group so as to equalize the
selection rates for qualified individuals between both groups. On the other hand, AA+ (over-
acceptance) accepts unqualified individuals from the disadvantaged group in order to equalize the
aggregate selection rates. One could think of AA– as increasing the standard for the advantaged
group and as such reducing total selection rates. As a peek at the intuition to develop, this could
possibly reduce the motivation for individuals to become qualified. As for AA+, one could think
of it as reducing the standard for the disadvantaged group. It is not as evident whether this could
potentially increase or decrease the motivation to become qualified. One one hand, it does present
the possibility of leading to a more qualified overall society by increasing the total selection rates
and training more unqualified people. On the other hand, selecting unqualified corresponds to the
condition of the so-called mismatch hypothesis [San04], which claims that this could actually reduce
the number of qualified individuals over time. This mismatch effect has been amply debated in
discussions on public policy with arguments on both sides [Ho04, AAFS11, San04]. One perspective
of the current investigation is to understand how the dynamics tip the scales in this debate.
4.2.2 Conditions for equality
Under AA, the analysis of equality gets complicated. This is mainly due to the fact that in
Proposition 4.6 there is a specific advantaged group. If from one time step to the next the advantage
changes, the identities of the groups swap. This in itself is not an issue, unless the swap also causes a
switch between the cases AA– and AA+. This last situation will not be considered for two reasons:
first, because it is too unwieldy, and second, because it does not arise if the dynamics are slow
enough, as formalized in Section 5. The conditions for equality given here are thus provisional on
remaining in AA– or AA+, with swaps or without. Here is a characterization to remain in one case
at all times, given with no proof as it follows from Proposition 4.6.
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Proposition 4.7. Let Cj,t := [pit(1|j) ≥ pit(1|¬j)] be the j-advantage condition. Resolving equality
either way, note that C¬j,t = ¬Cj,t. Let C−|j := [gju(1) + (1 − gj)u(0) ≤ 0] be the AA– condition
under j-advantage and let C+|j := [gju(1) + (1− gj)u(0) ≥ 0] = ¬C−|j be the AA+ condition under
j-advantage.
Then to remain in AA– at all times, it is necessary that for all t:
(CA,t ∧ C−|A) ∨ (CB,t ∧ C−|B),
and in particular it suffices that C−|A∧C−|B. Similarly, to remain in AA+ at all times, it is necessary
that for all t:
(CA,t ∧ C+|A) ∨ (CB,t ∧ C+|B),
and in particular it suffices that C+|A ∧ C+|B.
Another reason for the complication is because, under AA, the dynamics for one group depends
on the other group: in Proposition 4.6 there always exists one j for which the policy depends on
the qualification profiles of ¬j. The dynamics therefore have to be tracked jointly, unlike in UN.
Write
pit+1(1|A) = fA(pit(1|A), pit(1|B))
pit+1(1|B) = fB(pit(1|A), pit(1|B)) ,
where fA and fB are two components of a joint dynamics function f : [0, 1]× [0, 1]→ [0, 1]× [0, 1].
These components can be written in terms of f0 and f1 according to Equation (2) and Proposition
4.6, but have a complicated expression that accounts for all four cases (who is advantaged and
which AA case it is). Nevertheless, one could say that given dynamics of this form, equality will
be reached if as t → ∞ ∣∣f tA(pi0(1|B), pi0(1|A))− f tB(pi0(1|B), pi0(1|A))∣∣ → 0, for all pi0(1|A) and
pi0(1|B).
Similarly to the unconstrained case, since this would otherwise give no guarantees on the speed
of convergence, one can require f to satisfy the following contraction condition. There exists
L ∈ [0, 1) such that f satisfies:
|fA(pi, pi′)− fB(pi, pi′)| ≤ L|pi − pi′| ∀pi, pi′ ∈ [0, 1] (8)
This does not quite fit the classical Banach fixed-point theorem, but it is easy to show sufficiency.
That is, if the dynamics satisfy this condition then the population will reach equality. Indeed, let
pi0, pi
′
0 ∈ [0, 1]:
|fA(pi0, pi′0)− fB(pi0, pi′0)| ≤ L|pi0 − pi′0|
|fA(pi1, pi′1)− fB(pi1, pi′1)| ≤ L|pi1 − pi′1| ≤ L2|pi0 − pi′0|
...
|fA(pit−1, pi′t−1)− fB(pit−1, pi′t−1)| ≤ Lt|pi0 − pi′0|
Since L < 1 and |pi0 − pi′0| ≤ 1 then limt→∞ Lt = 0 and |fA(pit−1, pi′t−1) − fB(pit−1, pi′t−1)| ≥ 0 ∀t
therefore limt→∞ |fA(pit, pi′t)− fB(pit, pi′t)| = 0 and the population will reach equality.
As in the unconstrained case, this contractivity requirement on f can be reduced to sufficient
conditions on f0 and f1.
11
Proposition 4.8. Assume that AA– holds at all times, by the necessary or sufficient conditions of
Proposition 4.7. Then if
LAA– := max
pi∈[0,1]
|f1(0, pi)− f0(0, pi)| < 1 (9)
holds, then society equalizes.
Proposition 4.9. Assume that AA+ holds at all times, by the necessary or sufficient conditions of
Proposition 4.7. Then if
LAA+ := max
0≤∆≤pi≤1
2[piL1 + (1− pi)L0] + |f1(∆, pi −∆)− f0(∆, pi −∆)| < 1 (10)
holds, then society equalizes.
The proofs can be found in Appendix A. Note that while social equality conditions for UN and
AA– can be related, the condition for AA+ is not comparable to either of them in the sense that
there exist dynamics where one holds but the other does not. Observe however that the same two
components of condition (7) appear in (10). First, responses generally need to be stable: L1 and L0
have to be small. In AA+, this condition is more stringent than UN, due to the additional 2 factor.
Second, responses of both the qualified and unqualified have to be comparable: f1 and f0 need to be
close. In AA+, the main difference is that the comparison becomes sensitive to β0. This condition
may be indeed more lenient, if more unqualified selection makes the responses not necessarily higher
or lower, but more similar. To appreciate the kind of insight this provides, assume the mismatch
hypothesis holds, in the sense that f0 drops with larger β0. Proponents of the hypothesis assume
that this is a failure of affirmative action. Proposition 4.9 says that if f1 drops enough to meet f0,
AA+ could still lead to equality. And, as discussed in what follows (cf. Theorems 6.2 and 7.3), this
can be beneficial to society on the long run.
4.3 Effect of Stereotypes
Everywhere in this paper, except in this subsection, the policy maker is assumed to know exactly
the distribution pi of qualifications of both groups. But the institution relies on its estimator F to
identify qualified individuals, errors in F translate to errors  in estimates of group qualifications
and thus pˆi. As a result of these errors, it becomes hard to properly impose fairness constraints,
as even selections rates per true groups are unknown. But the framework allows one to investigate
the effect of certain types of errors on the dynamics.
At each time step t, define the errors in the qualification’s estimates as At and 
B
t such that
−pit(1|A) ≤ At ≤ 1 − pit(1|A) and −pit(1|B) ≤ Bt ≤ 1 − pit(1|B). Then the institution has the
following qualification estimates:
pˆit(1|A) = pit(1|A) + At
pˆit(1|B) = pit(1|B) + Bt
Assume the errors are small enough that one can sill identify which group truly is more qualified.
This translates to having Bt − At ≤ pit(1|A) − pit(1|B). Furthermore, restrict errors to be of the
form of positive or negative stereotypes. Concretely, if Bt ≤ 0, call this negative stereotype, the
institution identifies only
pit(1|B)+Bt
pit(1|B) of qualified individuals and considers the rest unqualified. If
At ≥ 0, call this positive stereotype, then it identifies all qualified individuals correctly and mistakes
At
pit(0|A) of unqualified individuals as qualified.
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The institution bases its policy on these estimates, however in terms of the actual distribution
the implemented policy actually differs.
If the policy acted upon is UN, meaning τ(1) = 1 and τ(0) = 0, with a positive stereotype
pˆi = pi +  ≥ pi, the actual policy is:
τ(1) = 1, τ(0) =

1− pi
And with a negative stereotype pˆi = pi +  ≤ pi:
τ(1) =
pi + 
pi
, τ(0) = 0
These policies are those that influence the next step distribution. Note that in both cases the
unconstrained condition for equality might fail to hold as the difference in selection rates between
the two groups can be exaggerated.
Now consider that the institution applies affirmative action. In the case of AA–, surprisingly,
given negative stereotype against group B, no matter if group A’s qualification is overestimated or
underestimated, equality is reached under the same cases as if the true distribution been known
(no stereotypes). However, given a positive stereotype for group B, then the conditions for equality
under AA– derived previously are no longer sufficient. Thus the AA– policy is robust to negative
stereotypes against disadvantaged groups.
On the other hand with AA+, with a negative bias against group A and a positive bias for group
B one can guarantee equality under the same cases as without stereotypes. A further treatment of
the actual policies and analysis of the above conclusions is left to Appendix B.
5 Dynamics in Continuous Time
While discrete time (DT) describes successive selection-response steps naturally, the arbitrary na-
ture of the dynamics can lead to sudden jumps and oscillatory behavior. These do not quite
correspond to how populations evolve in the real world, where one expects change to happen grad-
ually and slowly through time. Figure 2 shows the evolution of the percentage of bachelor degree
holders by sex in the United States of America. In 1967, 13% of men 25 years and older held a
bachelor’s degree or higher while 8% of women did [RB16]; this gap has decreased through time as
degree attainment increased for both sexes. In 2015, 33% of women held a college degree compared
to 32% of men, thus the proportion of degree holders equalized between both sexes in 47 years time.
One of the reported reasons behind this increase has been attributed to Title IX [oJ], a civil rights
law passed in 1972 aiming to eliminate discrimination in educational programs and the removal of
quotas against disadvantaged groups.
A change that is smooth and gradual can be modeled by transforming the discrete time dy-
namics into continuous time (CT). The transformation is standard, starting from dynamics (2) and
dropping group indices, one can rewrite it as a difference equation:
pit+1(1)− pit(1) = pit(1)
(
f1(βt(0), βt(1))− 1
)
+ pit(0)f0(βt(0), βt(1))
Now assume that the difference from t to t + ∆t for all ∆t > 0 is proportional to that from t to
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Figure 2: Percentage of the US population 25 years and older holding a bachelor degree by sex
from 1967 till 2015, adapted from [RB16].
t+ 1 (linear interpolation):
pit+∆t (1)− pit (1) = ∆t ·
(
pit (1) (f1 (βt (0) , βt (1))− 1) + pit (0) f0 (βt (0) , βt (1))
)
dividing by ∆t:
pit+∆t(1)− pit(1)
∆t
= pit(1)(f1(βt(0), βt(1))− 1) + pit(0)f0(βt(0), βt(1))
Now taking the limit as ∆t→ 0:
dpit
dt
= pit
(
f1 (βt (0) , βt (1))− 1
)
+ (1− pit) f0 (βt (0) , βt (1)) (11)
The CT dynamics thus derived (11) can be motivated in two ways. As is shown next, it maintains
the properties of the DT dynamics regarding conditions leading to social equality. Moreover, it
possesses additional properties that greatly facilitate the analysis.
The proof of this and all the following lemmas can be found in Appendix A.
Lemma 5.1. Assume the unconstrained policy is implemented in both discrete time (DT) and
continuous time (CT). If the sufficient condition of Definition 4.3 for social equality holds for the
DT dynamics with equilibrium point pie, then the CT dynamics also converges to pie starting from
any initial condition.
The following shows that populations in CT, unlike in DT, maintain their order.
Lemma 5.2. Following either an unconstrained or affirmative action policy in CT will preserve the
initial advantage. For example, if at t = 0, pi0(1|B) ≤ pi0(1|A) then for all t ≥ 0 pit(1|A) ≤ pit(1|B).
14
With Lemma 5.2, reaching equality with AA is straightforward in CT if it does in DT.
Lemma 5.3. If an AA policy in DT reaches equality by virtue of condition (8), implied in particular
by the conditions of Propositions 4.8 and 4.9, then in CT equality is likewise reached.
Thus to summarize, transitioning to CT does not break the conditions previously derived for DT
but in fact facilitates them. One can additionally give a bound on the difference of the distributions
between groups at each time step:
Lemma 5.4. If the DT dynamics is contractive with constant L ∈ [0, 1), then under CT the
difference between the distributions of both groups ∆t = pit(1|A)− pit(1|B) at any time t obeys:
∆0e
−t(1+L) ≤ ∆t ≤ ∆0e−t(1−L) (12)
Motivated by these properties, in what follows the remainder of the analysis of the behavior of
the selection process on the groups’ distributions due to the different policies is performed under
CT dynamics. The treatment could have initially started with CT dynamics, however the setup is
more intuitive in DT and motivates the transition better.
6 Affirmative Action under Natural Equality
This section is concerned with the following scenario: assume that using the unconstrained policy
equality is reached, what can happen if one instead follows an affirmative action policy? Even
though affirmative action may seem unnecessary, as without requiring further intervention equality
is reached, but can there be any additional benefit to applying fairness constraints and is one
guaranteed that in this setting equality will also be reached? This is relevant since the policy
maker may not be aware of operating in this regime.
Formally, make the assumption that the dynamics under the unconstrained policy (UN) is
contractive with constant LUN < 1, implying that there exists a globally attracting point pi
e. The
precise questions are then: are the conditions for equality with affirmative action also met? And
how does the cumulative utility obtained under AA policies compare to that under the UN policy?
Because in CT advantage is maintained (Lemma 5.2) and Proposition 4.8 applies (Lemma 5.3),
if AA– holds initially it continues to hold and the only remaining condition, which is therefore
sufficient, is Equation (9).
The following then holds.
Theorem 6.1. If equality is reached with an unconstrained (UN) policy then it is necessarily reached
by an AA– policy, however with no more, and possibly less, utility at each step.
Proof. Since equality is reached under the UN dynamics then ∀pi ∈ [0, 1]:
|f ′(pi)| ≤ LUN
where f ′ is the derivative of the dynamics under the UN policy. Expanding in terms of the proposed
dynamics:
|f1(0, pi)− f0(0, pi) + pif ′1(0, pi) + (1− pi)f ′0(0, pi)| ≤ LUN (13)
where f ′1 and f ′0 are the partial derivatives of f1(0, pi) and f0(0, pi) with respect to pi.
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Suppose for the sake of contradiction that |f1(0, pi∗)− f0(0, pi∗)| = 1 for some pi∗ ∈ [0, 1]. Note
that since both f1 and f0 take values in [0, 1], this implies that one of f1(0, pi
∗) or f0(0, pi∗) is 0
and the other is 1. Suppose pi∗ = 1. If f1(0, pi∗) = 1 it follows that f ′1(0, pi∗) ≥ 0 and thus f ′(pi) =
1 + f ′1(0, pi∗) ≥ 1. If instead f1(0, pi∗) = 0 then f ′1(0, pi∗) ≤ 0 and thus f ′(pi) = −1 + f ′1(0, pi∗) ≤ 1.
Both cases contradict the condition that |f ′(pi)| ≤ LUN < 1. The argument is similar for ruling
out pi∗ = 0. Finally, suppose pi∗ ∈ (0, 1). Then one of f1 and f0 attains its maximum at pi∗ and
the other its minimum, thus f ′1(0, pi∗) = 0 and f ′0(0, pi∗) = 0, implying that |f ′(pi)| = 1. This also
contradicts condition (13). It follows that |f1(0, pi∗)− f0(0, pi∗)| 6= 1 and thus AA– holds.
As the sufficient conditions for both AA– and UN to reach equality are satisfied, in CT the
equilibrium point pie will be reached by both policies, however their trajectories toward pie are
different and thus each achieves a different utility.
At each time-step t, to differentiate between the distributions due to different policies denote
by pit(1|A,UN) the distribution of pi(1|A) at time t due to the UN policy starting from t = 0, and
similarly for AA–. The utility of the UN policy at time t is:
Ut(UN) = gA · u(1) · pit(1|A,UN) + (1− gA) · u(1) · pit(1|B,UN)
and that of AA– at time t is:
Ut(AA
–) = gA · u(1) · pit(1|B,AA–) + (1− gA) · u(1) · pit(1|B,AA–)
Consider the difference of the utilities:
Ut(UN)− Ut(AA–) = gA · u(1) · pit(1|A,UN) + (1− gA) · ·u(1) · pit(1|B,UN)
− (gA · u(1) · pit(1|B,AA–) + (1− gA) · ·u(1) · pit(1|B,AA–))
Since under AA– and UN the trajectory of pi(1|B) is identical then pit(1|B,AA–) = pit(1|B,UN),
thus:
Ut(UN)− Ut(AA–) = gA · u(1) · (pit(1|A,UN)− pit(1|B,UN)
Following Proposition 5.2, one has that ∀t ≥ 0, pit(1|A,UN)− pit(1|B,UN) ≥ 0, and thus the utility
of the UN policy is always no less than that of AA–.
In light of this, the policy maker has no gain in enforcing affirmative action in this case.
Consider next how AA+ acts on the population in this setting. The sufficient condition (10)
for equality with the AA+ policy cannot be directly implied from the UN equality. However, under
AA+ group A’s distribution trajectory will reach the equilibrium point pie as the group’s policy is
identical to the UN policy in CT. On the other hand, group B’s distribution evolution through time
is unclear. The dynamics governing it is, with ∆(t) = pit(1|A,AA+)− pit(1|B,AA+):
dpit(1|B,AA+)
dt
= pit(1|B,AA+)(f1(∆(t), pit(1|B,AA+)−∆(t))
+ (1− pit(1|B,AA+))(f0(∆(t), pit(1|B,AA+)−∆(t))− pit(1|B,AA+)
Since pit(1|A,AA+) converges to pie as t→∞, then ∆(t) will only become a function of pit(1|B,AA+)
and pie. Therefore, the dynamics will approximately become an ODE with one variable, and
oscillatory behavior cannot exist in first order one dimensional ODEs [Str18], then pit(1|B,AA+)
will converge to some fixed point of the dynamics necessarily below pie. Looking closely, if pie was
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initially below pi0(1|B,AA+), then the trajectory of pit(1|A,AA+) will force group B to converge
toward the equilibrium point. On the other hand, if pie ≥ pi0(1|B,AA+) then nothing can be said,
thus unfortunately only worse off equilibria are guaranteed.
Now let’s assume the conditions for reaching equality with the AA+ policy are met to see what
could be the consequence. Specifically there exists LAA+ ∈ [0, 1) such that for all pi, pi′ in [0, 1] one
has:
|fA(pi, pi′)− fB(pi, pi′)| ≤ LAA+ |pi − pi′|
Similarly to the discussion in the AA– section, by comparing the cumulative utility with UN one
surprisingly finds a lifeline for enforcing affirmative action.
Theorem 6.2. Let α = (1 − gA)u(1)/((1 − gA)u(1) + |u(0)|). Assume UN and AA+ both satisfy
sufficient conditions (7) and (10) to reach equality in DT, assuming remaining in the same case.
Then if LUN and LAA+ satisfy the following:
LUN ≥ 1− α
and
LAA+ ≤ 1 + (LUN − 1)/α,
Then AA+ provides more utility in CT over an infinite time horizon.
Proof. Let us try to look at the difference between the utility at any time step t for the UN policy
and AA+ policy:
Ut(UN)− Ut(AA+) = gA · u(1) · pit(1|A,UN) + (1− gA) · u(1) · pit(1|B,UN)
− (gA · u(1) · pit(1|A,AA+) + (1− gA) · (u(1) · pit(1|B,AA+)
+ u(0) · (pit(1|A,AA+)− pit(1|B,AA+)) )
)
Since under AA+ and UN the trajectory of pi(1|A) is identical then pit(1|A,AA+) = pit(1|A,UN),
simplifying things:
Ut(UN)− Ut(AA+) = (1− gA) ·
(
u(1) · (pit(1|B,UN)− pit(1|B,AA+))− u(0) · (pit(1|A,AA+)− pit(1|B,AA+))
)
using the fact that u(0) < 0 and u(1) > 0:
Ut(UN)− Ut(AA+) = (1− gA)(u(1) + |u(0)|) · (pit(1|A,AA+)− pit(1|B,AA+))
− (1− gA) · u(1) · (pit(1|A,UN− pit(1|B,UN))
In DT the cumulative utility was the sum over all time steps, similarly in CT the utility will be
the integral of the utility function at each step evaluated from 0 till the final time step.
Now let us look at the total difference in cumulative utility over an infinite time horizon:
U(UN)− U(AA+) = (1− gA) · (u(1) + |u(0)|) ·
∫ ∞
0
(pit(1|A,AA+)− pit(1|B,AA+))dt
− (1− gA) · u(1) ·
∫ ∞
0
(pit(1|A,UN)− pit(1|B,UN))dt
Using the two-sided bound on the difference between group distributions of Lemma 5.4, we can
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lower bound the utility difference:
≤ (1− gA) · (u(1) + |u(0)|) ·
∫ ∞
0
exp(−t(1− LAA+) + ln(∆0))dt
− (1− gA) · u(1) ·
∫ ∞
0
exp(−t(1 + LUN) + ln(∆0))dt
= (1− gA) · (u(1) + |u(0)|) ∆0
1− LAA+
− (1− gA) · u(1) ∆0
1− LUN
We ask under what conditions of LAA+ and LUN can the above difference be negative:
(1− gA) · (u(1) + |u(0)|) ∆0
1− LAA+
− (1− gA) · u(1) ∆0
1− LUN ≤ 0
⇔ (1− gA) · (u(1) + |u(0)|) ∆0
1− LAA+
≤ (1− gA) · u(1) ∆0
1− LUN
⇔ 1− LUN
1− LAA+
≤ (1− gA) · u(1)
(1− gA) · u(1) + |u(0)|
⇔ LAA+ ≤ LUN
(1− gA) · u(1) + |u(0)|
(1− gA) · u(1) + 1−
(1− gA) · u(1) + |u(0)|
(1− gA) · u(1)
⇔ LAA+ ≤ 1 + (LUN − 1) ·
(1− gA) · u(1) + |u(0)|
(1− gA) · u(1)
Since we must have LAA+ ≥ 0, then we require LUN ≤ 1− (1−gA)·u(1)(1−gA)·u(1)+|u(0)| as a necessary additional
condition.
It is straightforward to see that LUN ≤ 1 + (LUN − 1)/α. A weaker version of this theorem can
thus be informally stated as follows: if under the unconstrained policy equality is reached slowly
enough yet under AA+ equality is reached faster, then AA+ results in a utility gain. This implies
that, rather than trading off, speed of convergence and utility go hand in hand.
7 Affirmative Action under Disparate Equilibria
7.1 Multiple Equilibria
It is more realistic to expect that myopically maximizing utility is unlikely to equalize the qualifi-
cations of groups. That is, one expects following an unconstrained policy to not lead to equality.
To model this scenario, the dynamics should not have a unique attracting equilibrium point. In
general one could have arbitrarily many, even infinitely many, fixed points for the dynamics. In this
section this is simplified to assuming that the dynamics under UN has a finite number of attracting
equilibrium points, each with its own basin of attraction. Thus the UN policy would not equalize
the groups unless they are initially close enough to fall in the same basin. The notion of such
dynamics can be formalized as follows.
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Figure 3: 3-equilibrium mapping under UN policy
Definition 7.1 (k-Equilibrium Dynamics). The function f obtained from (f0, f1) under the UN
policy is called a k-equilibrium (DT or CT) dynamics, if it is continuously differentiable and has
k fixed points pie1 ≤ · · · ≤ piek that are locally attracting (DT or CT) equilibrium points. Namely,
there exist k−1 delimiting fixed points δ1 ∈ (pie1, pie2), · · · , δk−1 ∈ (piek−1, piek), such that for all i ∈ [k]
and all pi0 ∈ (δi−1, δi), using the convention δ0 = 0, δk = 1, and semi-closed basins [0, δ1) and (δk, 1]:
pit → piei as t→∞,
where pit = f
t(pi0) (for DT) or pit is the solution at t of
dpi
dt = f(pi)− pi initialized at pi0 (for CT).
Remark. Note that it follows that the δi, i ∈ [k − 1] are unstable equilibria, under both DT and
CT dynamics, by virtue of being fixed points. The extremes pi = 0 or pi = 1 could also be fixed
points. If one or the other is an attracting equilibrium, then the notation implies pie1 = 0 or pi
e
k=1
respectively. If one or the other or both is an unstable equilibrium, then δ0 or δk or both join
{δi : i = 1, · · · , k − 1} as unstable equilibria.
Figure 3 illustrates a 3-equilibrium CT dynamics under an UN dynamics with the direction
of the gradient illustrated at each point. Observe the 9 possible joint equilibria that result by
following the UN policy, depending on where each group is initialized. See Appendix C for the
specific dynamics (f0, f1) for this illustration.
In the CT case, the necessary and sufficient conditions for f to be a k-equilibrium dynamics is
that ∀i ∈ [k]:
f(piei) = pi
e
i
∀pi ∈ (δi−1, piei) : f(pi) > pi (14)
∀pi ∈ (piei , δi) : f(pi) < pi
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Once again, sufficient conditions for CT are not so for DT. For example, one may have have
oscillations (think of the single equilibrium at 0.5 when f(pi) = 1 − pi.) One way to adapt (14) is
to modify it as follows:
f(piei) = pi
e
i
∀pi ∈ (δi−1, piei) : piei > f(pi) > pi (15)
∀pi ∈ (piei , δi) : piei < f(pi) < pi
Condition (15) allows dynamics that flatten out, giving an entire interval of equilibrium points.
Intuitively, this corresponds to slowdown. To address it, one can require that there exists a neigh-
borhood of radius ri > 0 around every equilibrium point piei such that:
df
dpi
≤ Li (16)
for some Li ∈ [0, 1) for all pi ∈ [piei − ri, piei + ri]. Conditions (15) and (16) guarantee that f is a
k-equilibrium DT dynamics. However, if f is already known to be a k-equilibrium dynamics, one
can still require (16) as local Lipschitz conditions that control the rate of convergence in both DT
and CT dynamics, just like was done for the single equilibrium case.
7.2 Eliminating Disparate Equilibria
The following shows that similarly to the single equilibrium UN, the AA– policy is equalizing even
under a k-equilibrium UN.
Theorem 7.2. Assume status quo bias, i.e. Assumption 3.2. Let f be a k-equilibrium dynamics
as in Definition 7.1, that further satisfies conditions (16). Let j be the initially advantaged group.
If the disadvantaged group starts at pi0(1|¬j) 6= δi for any i ∈ {1, · · · , k− 1}, following AA– reaches
equality in both DT and CT.
Proof. Consider first DT dynamics. By examining the proof of Proposition 4.8, it suffices to show
that |f1(0, pi) − f0(0, pi)| 6= 1, not for all pi, but only for pi ∈ [0, 1] reachable by the disadvantaged
group ¬j. In AA–, recall that the dynamics of group ¬j are the same as in the unconstrained case.
Since we assume that initially pi0(1|¬j) 6= δi for any i ∈ {1, · · · , k − 1}, it follows that the same
holds for all time t and none of these δi are reachable, because they are unstable equilibria.
Assume then, for the sake of contradiction, that there exists a pi∗ ∈ [0, 1] such that |f1(0, pi∗)−
f0(0, pi
∗)| = 1, from the status-quo bias Assumption 3.2, the condition reduces to f1(0, pi∗) −
f0(0, pi
∗) = 1.
This implies that f1(0, pi
∗) = 1 and f0(0, pi∗) = 0, thus f(pi∗) = pi∗, or equivalently pi∗ is an
equilibrium of the dynamics f . Additionally, by the same arguments as in the proof of Theorem
6.1, we can deduce that if pi∗ ∈ {0, 1} then f ′(pi∗) ≥ 1 and if pi∗ ∈ (0, 1) then f ′(pi∗) = 1.
It is not possible for pi∗ to be a stable equilibrium, i.e. for all i ∈ [k], pi∗ 6= piei . Otherwise,
condition (16), which requires that for all i ∈ [k], f ′(piei) ≤ Li < 1, is contradicted. The only
remaining possibility is for pi∗ to be an unstable equilibrium. But since these are not reachable, we
conclude by contradiction that we cannot have |f1(0, pi)− f0(0, pi)| = 1.
The CT case follows from Lemma 5.3.
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The above theorem states that following AA– is a guaranteed way to reach equality, however
equality comes at a price. Even more generally than Theorem 7.2, whenever AA– equalizes a
k-equilibrium CT dynamics (14), it always leads to worse long-term utility than under UN by
leading to a population with lower qualification. On the other hand when following AA+, equality
is always beneficial. The caveat is that, as in the single equilibrium case, under the conditions of
a k-equilibrium dynamics, one cannot deduce conditions for AA+ that lead to equality. Assuming
that these conditions do hold, however, guarantee a utility no worse than under UN by leading to
a population with higher qualification. The following Theorem characterizes this.
Theorem 7.3. Let f be a k-equilibrium CT dynamics. If the policy is AA–, and the equalizing
condition of Proposition 4.8 holds, then the equalized population generates long-term utility no
higher (and possibly lower) than the limiting population under UN. If the policy is AA+, and the
equalizing condition of Proposition 4.9 holds, then the equalized population generates long-term
utility no lower (and possibly higher) than the limiting population under UN.
Proof. Without loss of generality, let A be the advantaged group. Let i, j ∈ [k] with i ≤ j, let
pi0(1|B) ∈ (δi−1, δi) and pi0(1|A) ∈ (δj−1, δj).
Consider first the AA– case. Then the policy for group B is identical to the UN policy as long as
pit(1|B) ≤ pit(1|A) and from Lemma 5.2 this is assured. Therefore as t→∞, pit(1|B)→ piei . Since
the Proposition 4.8 condition holds, Lemma 5.3 implies that pit(1|A) → pit(1|B) and consequently
pit(1|A)→ piei . The equilibrium state is thus {piei , piei}.
Under the UN policy, one ends up with distributions {piei , piej} for groups B and A respectively.
While this state is possibly unequal however it possesses a higher utility value per time step.
Therefore, by reducing selection rates the population is forced to an overall less qualified state.
Consider next the AA+ case. Then the policy for group A is identical to the UN policy. Therefore
as t→∞ we have pit(1|A)→ piej . If the condition for equality under AA+ is satisfied then pit(1|B)→
pit(1|A)→ piej . Thus the population converges to the equilibrium state {piej , piej}. Compared again to
the UN policy, this is is possibly of higher utility value as i ≤ j. Therefore, by increasing selection
rates the population is pushed to be more qualified, but only if AA+ indeed reaches equality.
Figure 4 shows the difference between the gradient of pit under either AA
– and AA+ and UN,
for the dynamics which resulted in Figure 3 in a 3-equilibrium UN. This can be shown to satisfy
the conditions to make the AA– and AA+ policies equalizing. Note how the gradient difference for
AA– points generally downward and leftward toward states with lower utility as opposed to that of
AA+ which generally points upward and rightward toward equilibrium points with higher utility.
These illustrate qualitatively the kind of behavior characterized in Theorem 7.3.
8 Conclusions
Imposing fairness considerations on decision making systems requires understanding the influence
that they will have on the population at hand. Without knowledge of this influence, seemingly fair
constraints might in fact exacerbate existing differences between groups of the population.
This paper proposed a simple but expressive model of a selection process to concretely consider
these concerns. Namely, affirmative action was studied in terms of its ability to equalize the
qualifications of different groups. Imposing one case of affirmative action (under-acceptance of
qualified individuals) was shown to guarantee equality at the cost of worse institutional utility and
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Figure 4: Illustration of Theorem 7.3 for the AA– and AA+ policies respectively under the same
dynamics as that of Figure 3
possibly decreasing the population’s overall qualification level. In another case (over-acceptance of
unqualified individuals), however, affirmative action was shown to lead to a policy with different
characteristics: equality cannot be directly guaranteed to hold but when it does, it results, in
equilibria where the population becomes more qualified. Interestingly, this last case corresponds to
the debate on the mismatch hypothesis. The analysis here quantifies how both sides of the debate
can be correct, depending on whether society equalizes or not. This invites devoting attention to
the conditions under which over-acceptance tips society toward equality.
This paper is certainly not the last word on the role of dynamics in non-discrimination. The
hope is to spur many new lines of investigation. The proposed model and analysis could serve as
a framework to evaluate other non-discrimination constraints. More ambitiously, it could be used
to motivate and derive new constraints with explicit awareness of their long term impact.
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A Deferred proofs
A.1 Section 4
A.1.1 Proposition 4.2
Proof. If f has a unique globally attracting equilibrium point, it trivially holds that the dynamics
are equalizing. Next, assume the dynamics are equalizing. We prove by contradiction that there
can only be a unique globally attracting equilibrium point. Let pi1, pi2 and pi3 be three distinct
points in [0, 1]. Think of pi1 as the initial qualified fraction of group A. Then, if pi2 is the initial
qualified fraction of group B, and if starting at pi1 and pi2 respectively the trajectories of A and
B were to reach equality, then they must converge over time to a point pie1 ∈ [0, 1]. Next, think of
pi3 as the initial qualified fraction of group B. By the same argument, now the trajectories must
converge over time to a (possibly distinct) point pie2 ∈ [0, 1], since the definition of equalization
doesn’t assume a unique limit. However, if pie1 and pi
e
2 are different, it implies that the trajectory of
A from pi1 under f can differ, which is a contradiction since f is deterministic.
A.1.2 Proposition 4.6
Proof. By assumption at time t we have pit(1|A) ≥ pit(1|B), from this point on we drop the time
subscript for clarity. Let us now express the total utility (3) when the demographic parity constraint
(4) is satisfied:
U(τ) = gA · (u(1) + |u(0|) · (pi(1|A)τ(1;A)− pi(1|B)τ(1;B))
+ u(1) · pi(1|B)τ(1;B) − |u(0)| · pi(0|B)τ(0;B)
First of all we claim that pi(1|A)τ(1;A) ≥ pi(1|B)τ(1;B) for the optimal policy. If this is not
the case then it is possible to increase τ(1;A) and decrease either τ(0;A) or τ(0;B) while still
guaranteeing constraint (4) as pi(1|A) ≥ pi(1|B) all the while obtaining higher utility. Moreover,
the optimal policy will have τ(1;B) = 1 as increasing τ(1;B) will increase utility as τ(1;A) can only
increase and τ(0; ·) decrease in response. Similarly τ(0;A) = 0 as increasing it will only decrease
utility and force τ(0;B) to increase as a consequence, to meet the demographic parity constraint.
This in turn induces a lower bound on τ(1;A), where pi(1|B)pi(1|A) ≤ τ(1;A), next we show that
τ(1;A) can take only the two possible values: τ(1;A) = pi(1|B)pi(1|A) or τ(1;A) = 1.
Suppose τ(1;A) = c, where c is a value between its two possible bounds, then to satisfy the
demographic parity constraint (4):
pi(1|A)τ(1;A) = pi(0|B)τ(0;B) + pi(1|B)
we need:
τ(0;B) =
cpi(1|A)− pi(1|B)
pi(0|B)
Let us compare the utility between the policy with τ(1;A) = c and that with τ(1;A) = pi(1|B)pi(1|A) .
Since by assumption τ(1;A) = c is utility maximizing, the difference is positive:
0 ≤gA · u(1) · (c− pi(1|B) · pi(1|A)) · pi(1|A) + (1− gA) · u(0) ·
(
cpi(1|A)− pi(1|B)
pi(0|B)
)
· pi(0|B)
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= gA · u(1) · (cpi(1|A)− pi(1|B))− gA · u(0) · (cpi(1|A)− pi(1|B)) + u(0) · (cpi(1|A)− pi(1|B))
= (gAu(1) + gA|u(0)|+ u(0)) · (cpi(1|A)− pi(1|B))
We already have that cpi(1|A)− pi(1|B) ≥ 0 from our first claim, and thus for the overall difference
of utilities to be positive, then gAu(1) + gA|u(0)| + u(0) ≥ 0. However increasing c to c = 1 will
result in higher utility, therefore any interpolation is not optimal.
To summarize if gAu(1) + gA|u(0)|+ u(0) ≥ 0, we have τ(1;A) = 1, otherwise τ(1;A) = pi(1|B)pi(1|A) .
As a final note, if instead pit(1|A) ≤ pit(1|B), then it suffices to switch A by B in the conditions
and policies.
A.1.3 Proposition 4.8
Proof. Without loss of generality, assume that A is advantaged. Let pi be shorthand for pi(1|A) and
pi′ for pi(1|B). Due to advantage, we can write pi′ = pi −∆ for some ∆ > 0:
|fA(pi, pi′)− fB(pi, pi′)| = |pif1(0, pi −∆) + f0(0, pi −∆)− pif0(0, pi −∆)
− (pi −∆)f1(0, pi −∆)− f0(0, pi −∆) + (pi −∆)f0(0, pi −∆)|
= ∆|f1(0, pi −∆)− f0(0, pi −∆)|.
Since the latter is bounded by LAA– , it follows that the condition of the proposition guarantees the
contraction expressed in Equation (8).
A.1.4 Proposition 4.9
Proof. Without loss of generality, assume that A is advantaged. Let pi be shorthand for pi(1|A) and
pi′ for pi(1|B). Due to advantage, we can write pi′ = pi −∆ for some ∆ > 0:
|fA(pi, pi′)− fB(pi, pi′)| = |pi(f1(0, pi)− f1(∆, pi −∆))
+ (1− pi)(f0(0, pi)− f0(∆, pi −∆)) + ∆(f1(∆, pi −∆)− f0(∆, pi −∆))|
≤ ∆ · (2piL1 + 2(1− pi)L0 + |f1(∆, pi −∆)− f0(∆, pi −∆)|)
(triangle inequality + Assumption 4.5).
Since the latter is bounded by LAA+ , it follows that the condition of the proposition guarantees the
contraction expressed in Equation (8).
A.2 Section 5
A.2.1 Lemma 5.1
Proof. Under the unconstrained policy, the dynamics are an autonomous ordinary differential equa-
tion:
dpi
dt
= pi(t) · (f1(0, pi(t))− 1) + (1− pi(t)) · f0(0, pi(t))
At any time step t, the following will be shown. If pit < pi
e, dpidt is strictly positive. Otherwise if
pit > pi
e, dpidt is strictly negative and finally if pit = pi
e then dpidt = 0. This implies that the dynamics
converges to pie no matter the starting point.
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Indeed, if pit < pi
e, then dpidt = pit · f1(0, pit + (1− pit) · f0(0, pit)− pit = f(pit)− pit , where f(pi) is
the DT dynamics. Since the DT dynamics satisfies the following:
0 ≤ |f(pie)− f(pit)| ≤ L|pie − pit|
and using the fact that f(pie) = pie:
0 ≤ |pie − f(pit)| ≤ L(pie − pit) (17)
From Equation (17) we can see that we must have f(pit) > pit making the derivative positive.
If pit = pi
e, then dpidt = f(pit)− pit = pie − pie = 0, and finally if pit > pie the proof is similar to the
case where pit < pi
e.
A.2.2 Lemma 5.2
Proof. The conservation of advantage will be shown when following each of the noted policies. In
all of the following, at time t = 0: pi0(1|B) ≤ pi0(1|A).
UN: we remind that the UN policy is τ(1; ·) = 1 and τ(0; ·) = 0. As we are in CT, to have at some
t, pit(1|G = B)′ > pit(1|G = A) at any time t then from a simple continuity argument of the tra-
jectory of pi over time, there must exist a time point t′ < t such that pit′(1|G = A) = pit′(1|G = B).
However, then we must have ∀t > t′ that pi(t, G = A)′ = pi(t, G = B) so that order is conserved.
AA–: we remind that initially the AA– policy is τ0(1;A) =
pi0(1|B)
pi0(1|A) , τ0(1;B) = 1 and τ(0; ·) = 0.
Following the same argument of the UN case proof, for the groups to change order then there must
exist a time-point t′ such that pit′(1|G = A) = pit′(1|G = B), at that point the policy then becomes
τt′(1; ·) = 1 and τt′(0; ·) = 0 and thus the argument is exactly as in the UN case.
AA+: finally the AA+ policy is τ0(1;A) = 1, τ0(0;A) = 0, τ0(1;B) = 1 and τ0(0;B) =
pi0(1|A)−pi0(1|B)
pi0(0|B) .
Following the same argument for AA–, at the time t′ the policy becomes: τt′(1; ·) = 1 and
τt′(0; ·) = 0, therefore the argument is exactly as in the UN case.
A.2.3 Lemma 5.3
Proof. Any solution pit to the CT dynamics will satisfy the following integral equation [GCF
+08]:
pit = pi0 +
∫ t
0
dpi
ds
ds
Thus let us write the difference between the solutions of the two groups denoted by pi and pi′ under
AA and note that the CT dynamics (11) can be written as:
dpi
dt
= fA(pit, pi
′
t)− pit
dpi′
dt
= fB(pit, pi
′
t)− pi′t
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where fA(pi, pi
′) and fB(pi, pi′) specify the DT dynamics under affirmative action. Now let us track
the difference at any time t ≥ 0 of the distribution between both groups, denote ∆t := pit − pi′t and
assume that pi0 ≥ pi′0:
pit − pi′t = pi0 +
∫ t
0
(fA(pis, pi
′
s)− pis)ds− pi′0 +
∫ t
0
(−fB(pis, pi′s) + pi′s)ds
taking the derivative with respective to t:
∆t = ∆0 +
∫ t
0
(fA(pis, pi
′
s)− fB(pis, pi′s))ds−
∫ t
0
∆sds
Our assumption that the AA DT policy reaches equality implies that there exists L ∈ [0, 1) such
that inequality (8) holds, i.e. |fA(pis, pi′s)− fB(pis, pi′s)| ≤ L∆s, and since from proposition 5.2 order
is preserved:
∆t ≤ ∆0 +
∫ t
0
L∆sds−
∫ t
0
∆sds
d∆
dt
≤ (L− 1)∆t (18)
Equation (18) is obtained by differentiating with respect to t. Similarly since fA(pis, pi
′
s)−fB(pis, pi′s) ≥
−L∆s:
d∆
dt
≥ −(L+ 1)∆t (19)
From our assumption we know that L − 1 < 0 and ∆t ≥ 0 from proposition 5.2 so that ∀t ≥ 0,
d∆
dt ≤ 0 . Thus ∆t is strictly decreasing over time and is lower bounded by 0 and when for some
T , ∆T becomes 0 then this will be the case for all time t
′ > T by combining the lower bound (19)
and upper bound (18).
A.2.4 Lemma 5.4
Proof. Equation (18) gives us an upper bound on the derivative of ∆t given the DT dynamics are
contractive with Lipschitz constant L ∈ [0, 1):
d∆
dt
≤ (L− 1)∆t
assume that ∆t 6= 0 ∀t ≥ 0:
d∆
dt
1
∆t
≤ (L− 1)
integrating from 0 to t: ∫ t
0
d∆
ds
1
∆s
ds ≤
∫ t
0
(L− 1)ds
we get:
ln(∆t)− ln(∆0) ≤ t(L− 1)
arranging the terms:
∆t ≤ e−t(1−L)+ln(∆0) (20)
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If for some t′ ≥ 0 we have ∆t′ = 0, then the conclusion of our theorem will hold for all t < t′ with
the same proof and for all t ≥ t′ it trivially holds. Similarly using the lower bound in (19) we can
obtain the lower bound on ∆t.
B Effects of Stereotypes
Table 1: True policies under AA– with stereotypes
Stereotypes — Policy τ(1;A) τ(0;A) τ(1;B) τ(0;B)
At ≥ 0, Bt ≥ 0 min(1, pi(1|B)+
B
pi(1|A) ) 0 1
B
1−pi(1|B)
At ≤ 0, Bt ≥ 0 pi(1|B)+
B
pi(1|A) 0 1
B
1−pi(1|B)
At ≥ 0, Bt ≤ 0 pi(1|B)+
B
pi(1|A) 0
pi(1|B)+B
pi(1|B) 0
At ≤ 0, Bt ≤ 0 pi(1|B)+
B
pi(1|A) 0
pi(1|B)+B
pi(1|B) 0
Table 2: True policies under AA+ with stereotypes
Stereotype — Policy τ(1;A) τ(0;A) τ(1;B) τ(0;B)
At ≥ 0, Bt ≥ 0 1 
A
1−pi(1|A) 1
pi(1|A)−pi(1|B)+A−B
1−pi(1|B)
At ≤ 0, Bt ≥ 0 pi(1|A)+
A
pi(1|A) 0 1
pi(1|A)−pi(1|B)+A−B
1−pi(1|B)
At ≥ 0, Bt ≤ 0 1 
A
1−pi(1|A) 1
pi(1|A)−pi(1|B)+A−B
1−pi(1|B)
At ≤ 0, Bt ≤ 0 pi(1|A)+
A
pi(1|A) 0 1
pi(1|A)−pi(1|B)+A−B
1−pi(1|B)
Whenever Bt ≤ 0, we can see that the selection rates for value v = 1 are equal across both
groups. Therefore with the same analysis as the case without stereotype, the necessary condition
to reach equality still holds as long as for all t ≥ 0 Bt ≤ 0. However, this does not imply that the
trajectory of the distributions is the same but only that equality will be achieved.
On the other side, when applying AA+ the resulting policies are shown in Table 2. We never
recover in any of the cases the exact selection rates as those of AA+ without stereotype. However,
with the sufficient condition stated in (10), AA+ equality can be maintained:
When At ≤ 0, Bt ≥ 0, let ∆ = pi(1|A)− pi(1|B) ≥ 0, the resulting selection rates are as follows:
β(1;A) = pi(1|A)+A ≥ pi(1|A)−∆, β(0;A) = 0, β(1;B) = pi(1|A)−∆ and β(0;B) = ∆+A−B ≤
∆. Now we check that condition (10) is met:
|fA(pi(A), pi(B))− fB(pi(A), pi(B))| = |pi(A)(f1(0, pi(A) + A)− f1(∆ + A − B, pi(A)−∆))
+ (1− pi(A))(f0(0, pi(A) + A)− f0(∆ + A − B, pi(A)−∆))
+ ∆(f1(∆ + 
A − B, pi(A)−∆)− f0(∆ + A − B, pi(A)−∆))|
≤ (2δ − B)pi(A)L1 + (2δ − B)(1− pi(A))L0
+ |f1(∆ + A − B, pi(A)−∆)− f0(∆ + A − B, pi(A)−∆)|
(21)
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Finally, since (21) is less than LAA+ then the condition is satisfied.
C Figure 3
The 3-equilibrium dynamics in figure 3 are generated with the following f1 and f0 functions:
f1(β(0), β(1)) = 0.5(β(1) +
β(1)
5
)/1.4 + e−10
−9·(β(0)+β(1)) · sin (18(β(0) + β(1))) + 0.1
f0(β(0), β(1)) = (β(1) +
β(1)
5
)/1.2 + 0.01
The resulting function f is shown in figure 5.
f( )
1
e
1
e
2
2
e
3
Figure 5: 3-equilibrium dynamic function
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